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SUMMARY 
 
This study analyzes the subsidy effects on cooperative R&D and noncooperative 
R&D in a duopoly with uncertain spillover rates. Cooperative R&D, where firms 
invest in R&D to maximize their joint profits, is compared with noncooperative 
R&D, where firms invest in R&D to maximize individual profits. R&D level, 
production level, market prices, firm profits and social welfare are compared for 
cooperative and competitive cases. The effects of subsidy policies on these 
variables are investigated. Our model differs from previous works in two 
important ways: The spillover rates are uncertain, that is, the firms do not know 
how large the incoming and outgoing spillovers will be before investing in R&D. 
Secondly, the government maximizes the social welfare by subsidizing the R&D 
investments of firms. When the spillover rate is high, that is, the leakage of R&D 
knowledge is large, then competing firms get higher subsidies than cooperating 
firms. Moreover, the profit levels of competing firms are higher than cooperating 
firms due to these higher subsidy rates. On the other hand cooperative and 
noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of output, market prices and social 
welfare, different from the previous studies’ results, since public policy is 
included in the model.  
 
Keywords: Research and development, spillovers, public policy, subsidy, 
cooperation, noncooperation, uncertainty.  
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ÖZET 
 
Bu çalışma, işbirliği altındaki AR-GE yatırımları ve rekabet altındaki AR-GE 
yatırımlarında sübvansiyonun etkilerini inceliyor. Firmaların toplam kârlarını 
ençoklayacak olan AR-GE yatırım miktarına beraber karar verdikleri durum olan 
AR-GE işbirliği ile firmaların her birinin kendi kârını ençoklayacak olan AR-GE 
yatırım miktarına tek başına karar verdiği durum olan AR-GE rekabeti 
karşılaştırılıyor. Firmaların AR-GE düzeyi, çıktı miktarı, fiyat düzeyi, firma kârları 
ve sosyal refah, işbirliği ve rekabet durumları için karşılaştırılıyor. Devletin 
sübvansiyon politikalarının bu değişkenler üzerindeki etkileri inceleniyor. 
Çalışmamızın, önceki çalışmalardan iki önemli farkı bulunuyor: Öncelikle, bilgi 
yayılım oranı belirsizdir, diğer bir deyişle firmalar içeri ve dışarı sızacak bilgi 
oranından AR-GE yatırımını yapmadan önce haberdar değiller. İkinci olarak, devlet 
firmaların AR-GE yatırımlarını sübvanse ederek sosyal refahı maksimize etmeyi 
amaçlıyor. Bilgi yayılım oranının yüksek olduğu durumda, yani R&D bilgisinin 
önemli bölümü dışarı sızdığında, AR-GE rekabeti yapan firmalar, AR-GE işbirliği 
yapan firmalardan daha fazla sübvansiyon alır. Ayrıca, AR-GE rekabeti yapan 
firmaların kâr düzeyi, AR-GE işbirliği yapan firmaların kâr düzeyinden bu 
sübvansiyonun etkisiyle daha yüksek olur. Diğer yandan AR-GE rekabeti ve AR-GE 
işbirliği aynı düzeyde çıktı miktarı, fiyat düzeyi ve sosyal refaha yol açar. Modele 
devletin R&D politikası dâhil edildiğinden dolayı, bu sonuçlar önceki çalışmaların 
sonuçlarından farklıdır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Araştırma ve geliştirme, bilgi yayılım oranı, devlet politikası, 
sübvansiyon, işbirliği, rekabet, belirsizlik.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Firms engage in Research and Development to develop new products, reduce the 
costs or improve the quality of existing products. R&D is generally classified into 
two types: a) product innovation, searching for producing new products, and b) 
process innovation, searching for cost-reducing technologies for producing a certain 
product. In this study, we will consider process innovation, where firms invest in 
R&D to reduce their production costs.  
However, R&D efforts of a firm do not reduce only its own production costs but also 
its competitors’ costs. Since the discoveries cannot be kept entirely secret, there is 
always a leakage of R&D information from the innovator firm to the others, this 
information leakage is called spillover. Spillovers can occur in cases such as reverse 
engineering, movement of R&D personnel, input suppliers, scientific meetings or 
publication of scientific papers. The spillover rate indicates the proportion of the 
leakage to the entire R&D knowledge. Hence it takes a value between zero and 
unity. A high level of spillover rate would prevent the firm from investing in R&D.  
Because if the spillover rate is high, then the knowledge produced by a firm’s R&D 
project will soon become available to all of its competitors. So the R&D effort will 
reduce all firms’ production costs, this will only make them stronger competitors in 
the product market. Therefore the firm will not gain an advantage over its 
competitors in the product market although it is the one who expended on R&D. On 
the other hand, if the spillover rate is low, only the investor firm will make pretty use 
of its R&D knowledge. This will be an incentive for the firm to invest in R&D.  
In the case of high spillover rate, firms can coordinate their R&D investments or 
form a Research Joint Venture (RJV) and share their R&D information completely 
to avoid this negative externality.  
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Since R&D activities raise the welfare, public policy should always encourage the 
firms to invest in R&D. Governments have various policy tools to encourage the 
firms for R&D activities. First policy is giving a patent protection to the innovator 
firm that ensures earning monopoly profits for several years. However, this is not an 
effective way since it is very difficult to block spillovers in practice. Mansfield 
(1985) investigates the data obtained from a random sample of 100 US firms and he 
states that the information about R&D decisions of a firm generally leaks out to its 
rivals within about 12 to 18 months, and information about the detailed nature and 
operation of a new product or process generally leaks out within about a year. 
Second policy to stimulate R&D efforts is to allow firms to cooperate in R&D 
activities. In our model, firms are not forced to cooperate in R&D. They are free to 
act in the way to maximize their profits. The third policy is to subsidize the 
innovating firms. In our model, the government pays the innovator firm a subsidy, 
which will maximize the social welfare. This subsidy is some proportion of the cost 
of R&D faced by the firm. These subsidy rates depend on the firms’ R&D 
cooperation decisions in the pre-production stage.  
Free-ride effect is an important issue conditioning the interrelation between the 
profitability of R&D cooperation and spillovers. Free-riding is the incentive of a firm 
to benefit from the R&D investment of its R&D partner instead of investing itself. 
Free-riding reduces profitability and threaten the stability of a cooperative R&D 
agreement. Higher spillover rates, although they increase the profits of cooperating 
firms, also increase the risk of free-riding. An investing firm can avoid being free-
ridden by guarding its successful R&D knowledge.  
The study is organized as follows. In Section 2, previous studies on R&D 
environment with spillovers are investigated. In section 3, the model is presented and 
solved for the states of R&D cooperation and R&D competition. In section 4, the 
outcomes for both states are compared and the results are discussed. Section 5 
concludes the study.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON R&D COOPERATION AND SPILLOVERS 
The interest in cooperative and noncooperative R&D activities with spillovers has 
arisen in the last decade, after the paper of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), 
henceforth AJ. The papers following AJ are usually the extensions or modifications 
of their model. The examples are De Bondt and Veugelers (1991), Kamien et al. 
(1992), Motta (1992), Suzumura (1992), Poyago-Theotoky (1995), Leahy and Neary 
(1997), Salant and Shaffer (1998), Beath et al. (1989), Petit and Tolwinski (1999), 
Hinloopen (2000), Amir et al. (2003).  
AJ was the first to analyze cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers. 
They focused on the comparison of the level of R&D when firms carry out their 
R&D efforts competitively versus cooperatively, in the presence of spillovers. 
Cooperative R&D is the case when firms invest in R&D taking into account their 
overall profits. Competitive (or noncooperative) R&D is the case when a firm invests 
in R&D taking only its own profit into account. AJ considered a two-stage duopoly 
game with homogeneous products and symmetric firms. In the first stage, firms 
simultaneously decide how much to invest in R&D. In the second stage, they 
compete in the product market over quantities. AJ model showed that, for large 
spillovers R&D cooperation leads to higher welfare, R&D and output level than 
noncooperative R&D leads to. The opposite holds for sufficiently small spillovers. It 
was surprising to see that R&D investments were greater in R&D cooperation than 
in noncooperation. Before this paper, it was commonly expected that R&D 
cooperation agreements would lead to reduction in R&D expenditure, since the 
duplication of R&D would be prevented. The important factor in this result is the 
spillovers in R&D from one firm to another.  
Suzumura (1992, p.1308) explains the reason of this surprising result: 
The R&D incentive of a single firm hinges squarely on the extent of appropriability of the R&D 
benefits, so that the presence of large R&D spillovers may drastically reduce the incentives for 
cost reduction, with the result that the R&D commitment made voluntarily by a firm tends to be 
socially too small. From this viewpoint, an enforceable agreement on cooperative R&D efforts 
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seems to facilitate more commitments. The result of the net effect of the R&D cooperation 
hinges on the relative strength of these competing effects. 
Suzumura (1992) also showed that AJ model results are valid not only in the 
duopoly example with linear demand function and linear marginal cost, but also in a 
much wider class of oligopolistic industries.  
A detailed stability analysis of AJ model is presented by Henriques (1990). 
Henriques assigned specific values to the parameters and discovered small unstable 
regions in the spillover parameter space. In particular, it is shown that the 
equilibrium is unstable for low levels of spillover. De Bondt and Veugelers (1991) 
showed that R&D investments in cooperation are greater than in noncooperation 
when spillovers are substantial, supporting the results of AJ. 
Kamien et al. (1992), henceforth KMZ, extended the AJ model to more firms than 
two and the linear cost and demand functions to general function forms. AJ model 
was extended to this form also by Suzumura (1992). KMZ used a richer set of R&D 
cooperation scenarios. They considered four cases: R&D competition, R&D 
cartelization, RJV competition and RJV cartelization. In R&D competition, each 
firm decides its own R&D level to maximize its individual profit. In R&D 
cartelization, firms coordinate their R&D investments to maximize the sum of their 
profits. In RJV competition, firms behave like the case R&D competition, except 
that the outcomes of their R&D research are fully shared. So the duplication of R&D 
efforts is avoided and the spillover rate is at its maximum. In RJV cartelization, 
firms coordinate their R&D investments to maximize the sum of their profits as they 
do in case of R&D cartelization, but later they share R&D information completely, 
thus the spillover rate is again at its maximum. KMZ concluded that the RJV 
cartelization dominates all other scenarios, since it leads to the highest profit per 
firm, the lowest prices in the product market, the highest level of R&D and the 
highest social welfare. This implies that it also achieves the highest total consumer 
plus producer surplus among the four possible scenarios. On the other hand, RJV 
competition leads to the least reduction per unit cost and the highest product prices. 
KMZ described two types of externalities explaining the result of AJ and also theirs. 
First type of externality is called competitive-advantage externality: A firm’s R&D 
 5
investment has a negative external effect on its own profit, via reducing the marginal 
costs of competitor firms and hence making them tougher competitors. This 
externality inhibits a firm’s R&D expenditure. Second is the combined-profits 
externality, which can be negative or positive. A firm’s R&D investment has an 
external effect on the profits of all firms. This externality is ignored when each firm 
chooses its expenditure to maximize only its own profit and internalized when the 
firms coordinate their R&D expenditures to maximize the sum of their profits. The 
total effect of the two externalities is positive when the spillover rate is sufficiently 
high. In this case, R&D cartelization reduces marginal costs more than R&D 
competition, combined profits are higher and market prices are lower. Thus, both 
producers and consumers benefit as a result of this type of cooperation in R&D. The 
same result is obtained when comparing RJV competition to RJV cartelization, the 
latter being the more socially desirable.  
Salant and Shaffer (1998) extended AJ model for asymmetric strategies and showed 
that the overall joint profits can be larger if the firms make unequal investments in 
R&D. They showed that, for a particular region in the parameter space, the joint 
profit maximizing solution in AJ model is not symmetric. Reallocating the same total 
investment between the two firms can increase joint profits. Joint profit maximizing 
solution for a research cartel is to choose asymmetric investments at the R&D stage.  
Hauenschild (2003) introduced uncertainty of successful completion of R&D 
projects into AJ and KMZ models. He analyzed how this uncertainty influences 
technological performance in the sense of expected effective cost reductions. It is 
assumed that the R&D projects of both firms may fail independent of each other 
with some probability. Intended cost reduction only becomes effective with some 
probability between zero and one while the R&D project may also fail with positive 
probability. When deciding its R&D investment, each firm has to take into account 
the possibility of failing and the possibility of rival’s failure.  
Although the literature on R&D activities is enormous, the studies analyzing the 
effects of subsidies on R&D is limited. Main studies on R&D subsidies are by 
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Brander and Spencer (1983), Spence (1984), Romano (1989), Leahy and Neary 
(1997), Cassiman (2000), Hinloopen (2001).  
Brander and Spencer (1983) showed that oligopolistic firms that invested 
strategically in R&D in order to improve their position in the competitive market in 
the future, would carry out more R&D than the cost-minimizing level.  
Leahy and Neary (1997) introduced strategic behavior beside R&D cooperation. 
They considered two types of subsidy: subsidy to R&D and subsidy to output, where 
both of them are per unit subsidies. They presented three assumptions about the 
move orders in the oligopoly. The first assumption, full commitment equilibrium 
(FCE), has two stages. Firstly the government chooses both types of subsidies and in 
the second stage firms simultaneously choose their R&D levels and outputs (or 
prices). Second assumption, government-only commitment equilibrium (GCE), has 
three stages. First, government chooses both subsidies, then firms choose their R&D 
levels and at the last stage they choose the output/price levels. The third assumption 
about the move order is sequence equilibrium (SE), which is a four-stage game. In 
the first stage government chooses its R&D subsidy, then each firm chooses its R&D 
level, next the government chooses its output subsidy and in the last stage, firms 
choose their output/price levels. Leahy and Neary used the term “strategic behavior” 
referring to the R&D investments in GCE and SE, because of affecting the 
environment in which the output/price game is played. They showed that R&D 
cooperation raises output, R&D level and welfare when firms do not behave 
strategically. With strategic behavior, R&D cooperation raises welfare and requires a 
lower subsidy only when the spillover rates are high. Strategic behavior tends to 
reduce output, R&D and welfare and to lead to higher subsidies in all cases except 
the firms behave noncooperatively while spillovers are low and firms’ actions are 
strategic substitutes. Moreover, industry profits are always higher when firms choose 
their R&D level strategically and cooperatively. When the spillover is high, 
cooperation is more desirable from both private and social perspectives. 
Cassiman (2000) considered lump-sum subsidies and set the spillover level of firms 
as private information of the firms within the industry. In his model, the firms submit 
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their claims about their spillover levels, and then the government commits to its 
R&D policy.  
Hinloopen (2001) compared two R&D stimulating policy tools: sustaining R&D 
cooperatives and providing R&D subsidies. He showed that the latter enhances more 
private R&D. In his work the advantages and disadvantages of sustaining R&D 
cooperatives and providing subsidies are explained. Some of the advantages of 
sustaining R&D cooperatives are: it internalizes spillovers, it eliminates the free-
rider problem, and risk pooling can increase the research efforts. The disadvantages 
are: An agreement to cooperate in R&D can bring collusion in production stage, 
R&D cooperatives can act as a barrier to entry, efforts of an innovating firm can 
lower the profits of other firms more than it increases the profits of the innovating 
firm and hence widens the gap between actual R&D investments and socially 
optimal levels. Providing subsidies has some superiority over sustaining R&D 
cooperatives. Firstly, entry barriers for the research market are lowered. Secondly 
economies of scale are more easily realized since the cost of R&D on a sufficient 
scale are lower. However, there are some drawbacks of providing subsidies such as 
the tax imposed to finance the R&D subsidy carries deadweight loss. Another 
drawback is that the firms may deceive the authorities to obtain the R&D subsidy 
and the last one is that it is not clear before the subsidy is given that if government is 
subsidizing only successful research projects. Hinloopen showed that subsidizing 
cooperative R&D or noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of R&D activity, 
which is a conclusion similar to ours. However, Hinloopen sets a three-stage game, 
where in the first stage the authorities decide whether or not to provide an R&D 
subsidy, in the second stage firms determine their R&D investments either 
cooperatively or noncooperatively and in the last stage firms compete. Another 
difference is that the subsidies are per unit of R&D and firms are taxed in the 
product market to finance the R&D subsidies. Firms consider this corporate tax rate 
as given while determining their optimal level of R&D investment and optimal level 
of production. Hence, firms’ R&D investment and production decisions are 
influenced only by the R&D subsidy. The tax affects only the final profits. 
Hinloopen also states that the general effect of the subsidy and tax scheme is a shift 
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from producer surplus to consumer surplus, which always leads to a gain in net total 
surplus.  
 
3. THE MODEL 
Our model is an extension of AJ model, where uncertainty of spillover rates and 
public policy are included. We consider a four-stage game. The timing of the game 
is as follows: 
 
        
 
Figure 3.1: Timing of the game 
 
In the first stage, firms simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or compete in 
R&D investments. If they choose to cooperate, then in the third stage they will invest 
in R&D the optimal amount for maximizing their joint profits. If they choose to 
compete, they will invest the optimal amount for maximizing their individual profits. 
In the second stage, the government chooses the optimal R&D subsidy rate that 
maximizes the social welfare. In the third stage, firms decide how much to invest in 
R&D. Their investment depends on their decision of cooperation they made in the 
first stage. In the fourth stage, firms engage in Cournot competition in the product 
market so as to maximize their expected profits. We exclude the possibility of 
cooperation in the production stage, since it violates the antitrust laws.  
We analyze how firms determine their research efforts, taking into consideration that 
they compete in the final good’s market after the research is completed. The analysis 
has the following properties: It is a duopoly, i.e. there are two firms. Firms are 
symmetric. R&D efforts are directed to reducing unit costs. As in the AJ model, 
there is spillover from each firm’s R&D effort into the other, but we also assume that 
there is uncertainty in the spillover rates. The firms produce homogenous products. 
t1 t2 t3 t4 
Cooperation  
decision by firms 
Subsidy decision 
by the government 
R&D investment 
decision by firms 
Quantity decision  
by firms 
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There are no fixed costs and unit costs are constant. The market demand function 
and production cost functions are linear. R&D cost function is quadratic, reflecting 
the existence of diminishing returns to R&D expenditures.  
Our model differs from previous works in two important ways: The spillover rate is 
uncertain, that is, the firms do not know how large the incoming and outgoing 
spillovers will be. Secondly, the government subsidizes the R&D investments of 
firms, under this uncertainty.  
 
In the product market, the firms are faced with an inverse demand function of  
)(),( jiji qqbaqqP +-=          (1) 
with 0, >ba  , baqq ji /£+ , where iq  and jq  is the output of the firm i and firm j, 
respectively. Firm i's cost reduction provided by its successful R&D project is 
0>ix . On the other hand, it also reduces the production cost of firm j by an amount 
of ij xb , where jb  is the incoming spillover rate of firm j. Hence, the production 
cost function of firm i is  
ijiijiii qxxcxxqTC )(),,( b--=        2,1=i  , ji ¹       (2) 
with  ac <<0 , cxx jii £ + b , where the original unit production cost c, which is a 
constant, is reduced by the successful R&D project that the firm itself carried out and 
also the competitor firm carried out. The R&D cost is  
2
)()(
2
i
ii
xxC g=            (3) 
where 0>g  represents a parameter for cost of R&D whose high values mean that 
R&D cost is high. Therefore the parameter g  is inversely related to the cost 
effectiveness in R&D. The quadratic form reflects the diminishing returns to R&D 
expenditure.  
 10 
In our model, the government subsidizes the innovator firms in order to maximize 
the social welfare. The government chooses a subsidy rate that is a portion of R&D 
cost faced by the firm. Firstly, the firms decide whether to cooperate or compete and 
how much to invest in R&D in either states. Then, the government chooses the 
subsidy rate in the second stage. Therefore, the subsidy rate depends on the firms’ 
R&D cooperation decisions on the previous stage.  
The subsidy given by the government to support firm i's R&D expenditure is  
2
)(
)(
2
i
ii
xsxS g=           (4) 
where s  is the proportion of the subsidy to the total R&D expenditure )( ii xC  of the 
firm and hence between zero and unity ( 10 ££ s ). 
The profit functions of the firms are: 
2
)1()())((
2
i
ijiiijii
xsqxxcqqqba gbp -----+-=     (5) 
2
)1()())((
2
j
jijjjjij
x
sqxxcqqqba gbp -----+-=     (6) 
These are the general forms of profit functions valid for both R&D cooperation case 
and R&D competition case.  
The firms compete in the product market by choosing their optimal outputs to 
maximize their expected individual profits. The Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities 
are determined by 
iq
max  ip  and 
jq
max  jp .        (7) 
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This maximization process leads to the following first order conditions: 
02 =++---=
¶
¶
jiiji
i
i xxbqbqca
q
bp       (8) 
02 =++---=
¶
¶
ijjij
j
j xxbqbqca
q
b
p
      (9) 
Solving (8) and (9) simultaneously, we find the optimal quantities as follows: 
b
xxca
xxq jiijjii 3
)12()2()(
),(
-+-+-
=
bb       (10) 
b
xxca
xxq ijjijij 3
)12()2()(
),(
-+-+-
=
bb       (11) 
We obtain the equilibrium profits by inserting (10) and (11) into equations (5) and 
(6):  
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2
)1()12()2()(
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2 i
jiijjii
xsxxca
b
xx gbbp ---+-+-=    (12) 
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9
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x
sxxca
b
xx gbbp ---+-+-=    (13) 
However, the profit functions depend on spillover rates. Since the spillover rates are 
uncertain in our model, we will refer to expected profits instead of definite profits.  
Spillover rate parameter is between zero and unity ( 10 ££ b ). The spillover rate 
does not fall below 0 since a successful cost reducing R&D project of a firm does 
not cause any detrimental change in its competitor’s original production technology. 
The spillover rate also does not exceed 1 since a firm is unable to benefit from a 
successful cost reducing R&D project more than its original innovator.  
We consider a duopoly where both firms’ R&D spillover rates are uncertain. R&D 
spillover rates can either be low ( Lb ) or high ( Hb ). The firms decide their R&D 
investments and production quantities taking into account the expected spillover 
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rates of their own and the rival’s. The government carries out the optimal R&D 
policy under this spillover rates uncertainty. The probability of high spillover rate is 
l  and low spillover rate is l-1  for both firms.  
Hence, the expected spillover rate of firm i is  
LH
iE bllbb )1()( -+=          (14) 
where 10 £<£ HL bb , 2,1=i . 
There are four possible scenarios regarding the expected spillover rates. In the first 
one, both firms have a high spillover rate, Hji bbb == , with the probability of
2l . 
In the second scenario, firm i has a high spillover rate and firm j has a low spillover 
rate, Lj
H
i bbbb == , , with the probability of )1( ll - . In the third scenario, firm i 
has a low spillover rate and firm j has a high spillover rate, Hj
L
i bbbb == , , with 
the probability of )1( ll - . In the last scenario, both firms have low spillover rates, 
L
ji bbb ==  with the probability of 
2)1( l- . 
 
Considering four possible scenarios regarding the expected spillover rates, we can 
compute the following expected profits: 
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   (15) 
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The equations (1) to (16) are valid for both cases of R&D cooperation and R&D 
competition. However, the profit maximization process of firms will alter with 
respect to their decision in R&D cooperation. 
 
3.1. R&D Competition (Case N) 
In case of competition in R&D investments, each firm decides its own R&D 
expenditure to maximize its expected individual profit. To determine the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium we maximize the expected profits: 
ix
max  )( iE p   and  
jx
max  )( jE p        (17) 
and obtain the following best response functions1 of firms i and j: 
lbblbbg
lblblblb
 ) -( 2-1)-( )-(  2+-
--++---+
= HHLL
HL
j
HL
j
N
i
xac
sxx
44s)-(1 b 98
))2)1(21()()1(2(2
),(  
         2,1, =¹ iji  (18) 
Simultaneously solving the above conditions for ix  and jx , we obtain the 
equilibrium values2 of cooperative R&D levels of firm i and firm j as follows: 
                                                  
1 See Appendix B for the second order conditions 
2 See Appendix B for the stability conditions. 
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22)(4))(31(2)1(9)1(24
))1(2)((2)(
lbbbbbblgbb
lblb
LHLHLHLL
HL
N
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--+-
=  
         2,1=i   (19) 
Inserting (19) into equations (15) and (16), we obtain the following expected profits:  
222
2222
2222222
))(4))(31(2)1(9)1(24(9
/))))(4)209)(()2(5()1()(4
))())(2(2)2(()1(18)1(81()(())((
lbbbbbblgbb
lbblbbbbbllbb
lbblbbbbggp
LHLHLHLL
LHLHLHLLH
LHLHHLN
i
sbb
sbsbcasE
----++---+
-+-+-+----
----+--+--=
         2,1=i   (20) 
The government subsidizes the cost of the R&D project so as to maximize the social 
welfare, which is the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus from which the 
government transfers are subtracted.  
Producer surplus is the sum of expected profits:  
))(())(( sEsEPS Nj
N
i pp +=        (21) 
Consumer surplus is the measure for the consumers’ gain from trade, which can be 
computed by the triangular are in figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.2: Consumer Surplus 
 
P is the market price and Q is the total output where “*” indicates the equilibrium 
levels. The area beneath the demand curve and above the market price defines 
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consumer surplus as 
2
*2bQCS = . However, in our model we can speak only of 
expected quantities since the quantities depend on spillover rates that are uncertain:  
[ ]
2
)()( 2qjEqiEbCS +=         (22) 
where )(),( qjEqiE  are the expected optimal quantities obtained from equations (10) 
and (11) by substituting expected spillover rates described in equation (14) and also 
inserting ji xx ,  given in equation (19): 
))(4))(31(2)1(9)1(24(3
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Thus, the social welfare can be computed as 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
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Government determines the optimal subsidy rate that will be given to firms i and j by 
solving the maximization problem: 
s
max )(sW N          (27) 
as 
)))1(1(18
)1((27)7)1(78()1()(2 2
lblbg
lblbglblbllbb
HL
HLHLLH
N
i b
bs
--+-
--+--+--
=  2,1=i  (28) 
 
Inserting (28) into (19), we obtain the noncooperative equilibrium R&D levels of 
firma as follows: 
22)(6))(54(29)2(44
))(1)((4
lbblbbbbgbb
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LHL
N
i b
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-++-
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Inserting (28) into (20), we obtain the noncooperative expected equilibrium profit of 
firms: 
)))(6))(54(29)2(44(9(
/))))(19))(132542(
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Inserting (28) into (26), we obtain the equilibrium level of social welfare for the 
R&D competition: 
))(6))(54(29)2(44(9
))1()(109(c)-4(a
2
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3.2. R&D Cooperation (Case C) 
In case of cooperation in R&D investments, firms coordinate their R&D 
expenditures to maximize the expected overall industry profits, not their individual 
profits. Although firms take R&D decisions jointly, they do not share the results of 
their R&D efforts; there is no cooperation in R&D knowledge. So the marginal cost 
of production is decreased only by the firm’s own R&D effort and by the spillover 
from competitor’s R&D effort, in the same way it occurs in R&D competition.  
To determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, firms maximize their total 
profits: 
ix
max  )( jiE pp +  and 
jx
max  )( jiE pp +       (32) 
and obtain the following best response functions3: 
 
0
1)-(s b 910
)))2)1(25(2)()1(())1(1(4(2
),( =
 ) 5+(-8 2+1)-( )5+(-8  2-+
+---+-----+-++
=
lbblbbg
lblblblblblb
HHLL
HL
j
HLHL
j
j
C
i
xcaxc
sxx
        2,1, =¹ iji   (33) 
Simultaneously solving for ji xx , , we obtain the equilibrium cooperative R&D 
levels4 as follows: 
22)(8))(352(2)1(9)2(22
))1(1)((2)(
lbbbbbblgbb
lblb
LHLHLHLL
HL
C
i sb
casx
----++--++
--+--
=
         2,1=i   (34) 
Inserting (34) into equations (15) and (16), we obtain the expected profits:  
))(8))(352(2)1(9)2(22(9
)1()(10)1(9()())(( 22
22
lbbbbbblgbb
llbbgp LHLHLHLL
LH
C
i sbb
sbcasE
----++--++
-----
=  
         2,1=i   (35) 
                                                  
3 See Appendix B for the second order conditions. 
4 See Appendix B for the stability conditions. 
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As in the noncooperative case, the government subsidizes the cost of the R&D 
project so as to maximize the social welfare:  
[ ] [ ] [ ]
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Government decides the optimal subsidy rate for cooperative R&D by maximizing 
the social welfare function given in (37):  
s
max  )(sW C          (38) 
g
llbbg
b
bs
LH
C
i 18
)1()(109 2 --+
=   2,1=i      (39) 
 
Inserting (39) into (34), we obtain the level of R&D that cooperating firms decide to 
invest after the government decides the optimal subsidy rate: 
2)(6))(54(29)2(44
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lbblbbbbgbb
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Inserting (39) into (35), we obtain the expected profit of cooperating firms: 
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Inserting (39) into (37), we obtain the social welfare, which is maximized by the 
government, in case of R&D cooperation: 
))(6))(54(29)2(44(9
))1()(109(c)-4(a
2
22
lbblbbbbgbb
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bb
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4. COMPARISON OF CASES 
The effect of R&D cooperation on the social welfare, profits, prices, output 
quantities and subsidies will be analyzed by comparing the two cases.  
 
Proposition 1: Cooperating or competing in R&D investment stage yields the same 
levels of R&D provided that the government subsidizes firms’ R&D costs.  
Comparing the equations (29) and (40), we conclude that 
C
i
N
i xx =   2,1=i         (43) 
We know from AJ’s result that, for large spillovers, the level of R&D increases 
when firms cooperate in R&D. It is interesting to observe that with subsidized R&D, 
without depending on the spillover rate, we obtain the same R&D level for both of 
the cooperative and noncooperative cases.  
 
Proposition 2: Cooperating or competing in R&D investment stage yields the same 
levels of social welfare provided that the government subsidizes firms’ R&D costs.  
The welfare functions defined in the equations (31) and (42) are equal to each other: 
CN WW =   2,1=i         (44) 
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Government adjusts subsidies so that it will maximize the social welfare, where the 
optimal levels of social welfare are the same in both cases.  
 
Proposition 3: Cooperating or competing in R&D investment stage does not lead to 
different levels of output and price provided that the government subsidizes firms’ 
R&D costs.  
The amount of outputs Niq , 
C
iq  are symmetric and they are functions of R&D levels 
N
j
N
i xx , ,
C
j
C
i xx ,  as defined in equations (10) and (11). The equality of R&D levels in 
two cases ( Ci
N
i xx = ), leads to the equality of outputs:  
C
i
N
i qq =   2,1=i         (45) 
Since the market prices are functions of output quantities  
)( Nj
N
i
N qqbaP +-= , )( Cj
C
i
C qqbaP +-=   
and the quantities in two cases are equal to each other, the market prices in both 
cases will also be equal: 
CN PP =   2,1=i         (46) 
 
An analytical comparison of subsidies and firm profits is mostly inconclusive 
because of the large number of parameters of the model. So we restrict ourselves to a 
numerical and graphical analysis. For these comparisons, the following numerical 
values are assigned to the parameters: 1=- ca , 2=b , 1=g . Now the subsidies and 
profits are functions of only LH bb ,  and l . These parameter values are chosen to 
satisfy the first and second order conditions and the stability conditions of R&D 
levels and profit levels5. Although we assign numerical values to these three 
parameters, all relevant results are qualitatively robust against variations in these 
                                                  
5 See Appendix C for second order and stability conditions satisfied by the numerical values. 
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parameters. Different values of the parameter ca -  do not lead to any change in 
results since it is only a scaling factor.  
 
Assigning the values 2=b , 1=g  to the parameters in equations (28) and (39), we 
obtain the firm-symmetric optimal subsidy rates: 
))1(1(18
))1((27)7)1(78()1()( 2
lblb
lblblblbllbb
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))1()(59(
18
1 2 llbb --+= LHCs        (48) 
 
Assigning the values 1=- ca , 2=b , 1=g  to the parameters in equations (30) and 
(41), we obtain the firm profits: 
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Now the subsidies and profits are dependent only on the parameters lbb ,, LH . Due 
to the numerical analysis above we reach the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 4: For sufficiently large values of expected spillover rates 
( 2/1)( ³bE ), the optimal subsidy rate chosen by the government in noncooperative 
case is greater than the rate chosen in cooperative case.  
 
The subsidies in both cases of cooperation and competition in R&D, that is, Ns  and 
Cs  will be compared via analyzing the difference NC ss -  graphically. When the 
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difference is positive it indicates that NC ss > , which means the optimal subsidy rate 
chosen in case of R&D cooperation is greater than the subsidy rate in R&D 
noncooperation. The opposite holds for a negative difference. We will repeat this 
analysis for different values of l , i.e. probability of high spillover rate. Afterwards, 
we will attain some general implications regarding the subsidy rates under different 
spillover rates.  
Proposition 4 can be verified by analyzing the figures 3.3-3.5 and A.1-A.3. Figures 
3.3-3.5 are the three-dimensional graphics of NC ss -  across Hb  and Lb  for three 
different values of l . Notice that assigning a value to the probability of high 
spillover rate ( l ), also means assigning a value to the probability of low spillover 
rate ( l-1 ). 
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Figure 3.3:  sC – sN as a function of βH and βL when λ  = 0.3 
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Figure 3.4:  sC – sN as a function of βH and βL when λ  = 0.5 
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Figure 3.5:  sC – sN as a function of βH and βL when λ  = 0.8 
 
It is observed that NC ss -  is negative for some values of Hb  and Lb  and positive 
for some other values. Now we will analyze these values to see how LH bb , affect 
NC ss - . The analysis is carried out by drawing two-dimensional graphics of 
NC ss -  across Lb . Three-dimensional graphics are reduced to two-dimensional 
graphics by assigning consecutive Hb  values between 0 and 1. The procedure is 
repeated for other values of l  to find a general implication about the relation 
between spillover rates and subsidy policies. Two-dimensional graphics of NC ss -  
across Lb  is shown in figures A.1-A.3 in Appendix A. Lb  values which makes 
NC ss -  positive/negative are detected for each l  and then expected spillover rates 
are computed via equation (14). The results are shown in Tables 3.1-3.3.  
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Table 3.1: The relation between expected spillover rate and subsidy rate when λ  = 0.3 
βH βL 
E(β) 
= λβH+(1-λ) βL 
Subsidy rate 
comparison 
≤ 0.5 All βL 6 ≤ 0.493 sC > sN 
= 0.6 ≤ 0.45 ≤ 0.495 sC > sN 
= 0.6 > 0.45 ≥ 0.495 sC <  sN 
= 0.7 ≤ 0.39 ≤ 0.483 sC > sN 
= 0.7 > 0.39 > 0.483 sC <  sN 
= 0.8 ≤ 0.32 ≤ 0.464 sC > sN 
= 0.8 > 0.32 > 0.464 sC <  sN 
= 0.9 ≤ 0.24 ≤ 0.438 sC > sN 
= 0.9 > 0.24 > 0.438 sC <  sN 
= 1.0 ≤ 0.13  ≤ 0.391 sC > sN 
= 1.0 > 0.13  > 0.391 sC < sN 
 
Table 3.2: The relation between expected spillover rate and subsidy rate when λ  = 0.5 
βH βL 
E(β) 
= λβH+(1-λ) βL 
Subsidy rate 
comparison 
≤ 0.5 All βL ≤ 0.495 sC > sN 
= 0.6 ≤ 0.38  ≤ 0.490 sC > sN 
= 0.6 > 0.38 > 0.490 sC <  sN 
= 0.7 ≤ 0.22 ≤ 0.460 sC > sN 
= 0.7 > 0.22 > 0.460 sC <  sN 
≥ 0.8 All βL > 0.400 sC <  sN 
   
Table 3.3: The relation between expected spillover rate and subsidy rate when λ  = 0.8 
βH βL 
E(β) 
= λβH+(1-λ) βL 
Subsidy rate 
comparison 
≤ 0.5 All βL ≤ 0.498 sC > sN 
> 0.5 All βL ≥ 0.480 sC <  sN 
 
For all l , the optimal subsidy rate chosen in case of cooperative R&D is less than 
the optimal subsidy rate chosen in case of noncooperative R&D, as long as the 
expected spillover rate is sufficiently large, that is 5.0)( ³bE . The opposite holds 
when the expected spillover rate is sufficiently small, such that 39.0)( £bE . 
                                                  
6 Notice that 0≤ βL < βH ≤1. Hence, the statement “all βL” refers to βL in the interval [0, βH] 
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Proposition 5: For sufficiently large values of expected spillover rates 
( 2/1)( ³bE ), the profit levels of noncooperative firms are greater than the profit 
levels of cooperative firms. 
The expected profit levels in both cases of cooperation and competition in R&D, that 
is Np  and Cp , will be compared via analyzing the difference NC pp -  graphically, 
in exactly the same way as subsidy rate is compared. When the difference is positive, 
i.e. NC pp > , the profits of firms behaving cooperatively in R&D is greater than the 
profits of noncooperative firms. The opposite holds for a negative difference. Again 
the analysis will be repeated for different values of l  to draw general implications 
regarding the profits under different spillover rates.  
Proposition 5 can be verified by analyzing the figures 3.6-3.8 and A.4-A.6. The 
three-dimensional graphics of NC pp -  across Hb  and Lb  is shown in figures 3.6-
3.8, where each graphic is drawn for a different value of l .  
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Figure 3.6:  πC – πN as a function of βH and βL when λ  = 0.3 
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Figure 3.7:  πC – πN as a function of βH and βL when λ  = 0.5 
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Figure 3.8:  πC – πN as a function of βH and βL when λ  = 0.8 
 
To explore the regions where NC pp -  becomes negative, three-dimensional 
graphics are reduced to two-dimensional graphics by assigning Hb  values between 
0 and 1. When the procedure is repeated for other values of l , figures A.4-A.6 are 
obtained. Lb  values which makes NC pp -  positive/negative in these figures are 
detected for each l  and then the corresponding expected spillover rates are 
computed via equation (14) to find a general implication about the relation between 
spillover rates and profits. The results are shown in Tables 3.4-3.6. 
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Table 3.4: The relation between expected spillover rate and profit level when λ  = 0.3 
βH βL 
E(β) 
= λβH+(1-λ) βL 
Profit 
comparison 
≤ 0.5 All βL  ≤ 0.493 πC > πN 
= 0.6 ≤ 0.45 ≤ 0.495 πC > πN 
= 0.6 > 0.45 ≥ 0.495 πC < πN 
= 0.7 ≤ 0.39 ≤ 0.483 πC > πN 
= 0.7 > 0.39 > 0.483 πC < πN 
= 0.8 ≤ 0.32 ≤ 0.464 πC > πN 
= 0.8 > 0.32 > 0.464 πC < πN 
= 0.9 ≤ 0.24 ≤ 0.438 πC > πN 
= 0.9 > 0.24 > 0.438 πC < πN 
= 1.0 ≤ 0.13  ≤ 0.391 πC > πN 
= 1.0 > 0.13  > 0.391 πC < πN 
Table 3.5: The relation between expected spillover rate and profit level when λ  = 0.5 
βH βL 
E(β) 
= λβH+(1-λ) βL 
Profit 
comparison 
≤ 0.5 All βL ≤ 0.495 πC > πN 
= 0.6 ≤ 0.38  ≤ 0.490 πC > πN 
= 0.6 > 0.38 > 0.490 πC < πN 
= 0.7 ≤ 0.22 ≤ 0.460 πC > πN 
= 0.7 > 0.22 > 0.460 πC < πN 
≥ 0.8 All βL > 0.400 πC < πN 
Table 3.6: The relation between expected spillover rate and profit level when λ  = 0.8 
βH βL 
E(β) 
= λβH+(1-λ) βL 
Profit 
comparison 
≤ 0.5 All βL ≤ 0.498 πC > πN 
> 0.5 All βL ≥ 0.480 πC < πN 
 
For sufficiently large values of expected spillover rates, that is 5.0)( ³bE , the 
profits in noncooperative R&D is higher than the profits in cooperative R&D. The 
opposite holds when the expected spillover rate is sufficiently small, such 
that 39.0)( £bE . These results hold for all l .  
This result can be explained by analyzing the components of profit function. Profit 
level is the total revenue where production cost and R&D cost is subtracted from and 
subsidy is added on. Since the prices and output quantities are equal for two cases, 
 28 
total revenue is also the same. Since the R&D levels are equal, R&D costs are also 
equal. Then only subsidy is left as the reason of different profit levels. Hence, for 
large spillovers, the higher subsidy rates in noncooperative R&D lead to also higher 
profits. The opposite holds for small spillovers. As a result, the firms will tend to 
compete in R&D when the spillover rate is sufficiently large, and to cooperate when 
it is small, which is the result of the first stage of the game.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The cooperative and competitive R&D with uncertain spillover rates are analyzed in 
a duopoly where R&D costs are subsidized by the government. The effects of 
subsidy policies on production level, market prices, social welfare and firm profits 
are investigated. Although the model is based on AJ model, our results are different 
from theirs, because of the public policy extension of the model.  
One of the common results on R&D literature is the fact that when the spillovers are 
sufficiently large, cooperative R&D leads to higher R&D level than the 
noncooperative R&D does. But we get rather different results since public policy is 
introduced to our model. In our model, subsidy policies of government lead to equal 
levels of welfare and R&D investment in both cases of cooperative and competitive 
R&D. The spillover rate does not affect welfare or R&D level, as it does in AJ or 
KMZ models, since in our model there is an optimal level of R&D that maximizes 
social welfare and government adjusts the subsidy rate such that firms choose this 
R&D level in both cases for any rate of spillover. As a result of the subsidy policy, 
R&D levels in both cases are optimal and equal to each other.  
Since the government chooses the subsidy rate which will lead to the same 
maximized welfare in both cases, it chooses a higher subsidy in noncooperative case 
as long as the spillover rate is sufficiently high. This result is compatible with AJ’s 
result: “for large spillovers the level of R&D increases when firms cooperate in 
R&D”. This difference of R&D levels in two cases mentioned in AJ model is 
compensated by subsidies in our model. Therefore the R&D levels in both cases are 
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equal and optimal subsidy rate increases when firms compete in R&D with large 
spillovers.  
Another common result on R&D literature is that when the spillovers are sufficiently 
large, cooperative R&D leads to higher profit levels than noncooperative R&D does, 
as proved in KMZ. However, this is the state where there is no subsidy. When we 
introduce subsidy policy into the model, the profits increase when firms compete in 
case of large spillovers and decrease when spillovers are low. Analyzing the 
components of the profit level, we concluded that different subsidy rates is the 
reason of different profit levels in two cases. Hence when spillover is large, the 
subsidy rate chosen for competing firms is higher than the subsidy rate chosen for 
cooperating firms that, this subsidy difference provides the competing firms more 
profit than cooperating firms. The opposite holds for small spillovers. As a result, the 
firms will tend to compete when the expected spillover rate is high and to cooperate 
when it is low. 
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Figure A.1: sC – sN as a function of βL for different values of βH when λ  = 0.3 
APPENDIX A 
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Figure A.2: sC – sN as a function of βL for different values of βH when λ  = 0.5 
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Figure A.3: sC – sN as a function of βL for different values of βH when λ  = 0.8 
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Figure A.4: πC – πN as a function of βL for different values of βH when λ  = 0.3 
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Figure A.5: πC – πN as a function of βL for different values of βH when λ  = 0.5 
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Figure A.6: πC – πN as a function of βL for different values of βH when λ  = 0.8 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B.1. Second Order Conditions 
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Case C:  
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B.2. Stability Conditions 
 
1
)(
<
¶
¶
j
ji
x
xx
 1
)(
<
¶
¶
i
ij
x
xx
  2,1, =¹ iji      (55) 
 
)( ji xx  and )( ij xx  is obtained by inserting (28) into (18) for case N and (39) into 
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